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1. INTRODUCTION
Reliability threats in the hardware (HW) of digital systems are expected to intensify
with the reduction of device dimensions [McPherson 2006]. Aggressive energy reduction
threatens the performance [Borkar et al. 2011] and binary correctness [Kumar et al.
2009] of modern digital systems. As a result, low-energy designs should be enhanced
with appropriate reliability solutions. In the past, static mitigation techniques have
been developed [Sorin 2009]. As the power and area constraints become increasingly
strict, exclusive use of these techniques introduces infeasible overheads. It is highly de-
sirable to explore near-optimal mitigation solutions, which alleviate reliability threats
while not violating the power and area restrictions of the design [Cho et al. 2012].
The creation of such solutions requires a comprehensive understanding of the phys-
ically induced violations that need to be mitigated. To create appropriate mitigation
techniques, we need to understand how these effects propagate within a system. Fur-
thermore, we need to quantify what is the effect of this propagation in relation to the
system’s operating conditions and workload.
Reliability analysis and modeling are the answers to these two questions. The pur-
pose of this survey is to provide a complete and systematic categorization methodology
that addresses all approaches in this domain. This categorization allows identification
of regions that have received varying degrees of attention by the research community.
The interaction and interdependencies between reliability analysis and reliabilitymod-
eling is also illustrated. Research trends can be identified and guidance is provided for
novel approaches. Judging from the plethora of reliability aspects addressed in the liter-
ature, we need to set the content boundaries of the current survey. Hence, the following
areas are beyond our scope: (1) reliability issues due to malicious attacks [Avizienis
et al. 2004]; (2) software (SW) quality/interaction [Walia et al. 2006; Tyagi et al. 2011];
(3) nonelectronic threats [Koganemaru et al. 2008; Peng et al. 2009]; (4) power systems
engineering or power grid issues (e.g., [Yokoyama et al. 2008]); (5) derivation of novel
reliability metrics and enumeration of the existing ones; (6) classification based on the
duration and repeatability of reliability violations; and (7) the actual mitigation solu-
tions handling reliability threats. An exhaustive listing of possible reliability violations
is also out of scope.
We focus on the analysis and modeling of malfunctions that are caused by specific
physical mechanisms in the system’s HW. Analysis techniques track the propagation
of these mechanisms’ effects to higher abstraction levels. Modeling formulates correla-
tions between the degree of propagation and combinations of operating conditions and
workload. It should be noted that papers presenting mitigation approaches usually
come with an evaluation of the latter, in the form of a reliability analysis experiment.
Such papers still provide a good source of related analysis techniques.
The contributions of this article are as follows. We build a broad classification frame-
work on reliability analysis and modeling. It is composed of complementary categories,
where state-of-the-art approaches are mapped based on their relevance. Works be-
longing to multiple categories (i.e., hybrids) are inspected, with each of their aspects
analyzed in the appropriate category. Thus, we create a complete and consistent clas-
sification of approaches toward reliability analysis and modeling. We also provide a
consistent set of definitions for terms frequently used across the text.
This survey is organized as follows. Section 2 provides key terminology, related
classification work, and an overview of our methodology. Section 3 presents reusable
concepts across our classification and an overview of the latter. Reliability analysis
is presented in Section 4. Section 5 deals with reliability modeling. The extensibil-
ity of our classification is illustrated in Section 6. Conclusions are summarized in
Section 7.
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1. Terminology
In this section, we define some terms that will be extensively used to avoid any
ambiguity in later parts of the text. We also strive for consistency with the terminology
that has been used up to this point in the literature. It is important to note that the
definitions presented section are outlined in accordance to the classification framework
methodology of Section 2.3—namely, they create complementary pairs. This allows
the creation of reusable classification frameworks (Section 3.1), which will alleviate
the complexity of our classification.
2.1.1. Digital System Components and Partitioning.
Definition 2.1. Hardware (HW) is a set of permanent components of a digital system.
To emphasize on the availability of a manufactured sample, we use the term pure HW.
When we are unable to obtain pure HW, we need to resort to a HW description.
The Gajski-Kuhn Y-chart [Gajski et al. 1983] presents the possible representations
and abstraction levels where a HW description may reside.
Definition 2.2. Software (SW) refers to the set of coded features that are executed
by a digital system. It must not be confused with a HW description, even if the latter
may be available in the form of an algorithmic description.
The SWof a digital systemmay be specific to a single service among the ones delivered
by this system (e.g., device driver). Generic SW utilities may be available, which are
not specific to a single provided service (e.g., scheduler of the operating system).
Definition 2.3. Operating conditions represent the interference caused to a digital
system by its environment. This interference may originate from neighboring sys-
tems (e.g., electromagnetic interference (EMI)) or from natural stimuli (e.g., cosmic
particles).
Hence, to completely define a digital system, we need to describe its:
(1) HW, either as pure HW or an equivalent HW description
(2) SW, with parts specific to a single service and general-purpose components
(3) Operating conditions: natural stimuli and interference with neighboring systems.
Definition 2.4. A black box is a subset of the digital system’s HW, the internals of
which cannot be observed. Hence, its component connection scheme is unavailable.
A black box may refer either to pure HW or a HW description. To define a black box,
we need to describe its boundaries and the respective abstraction level. For a reliability
assessment of a digital system, it is important to identify its black boxes and assess
their observability and controllability through a series of input/output (I/O) ports.
2.1.2. Reliability Assessment.
Definition 2.5. Reliability violation is an umbrella term describing any deviation of
a digital system from its correct and expected operation. The term is used regardless of
the deviation’s severity, and hence it covers minor through fundamental malfunctions.
In the context of this survey, we only assume physically induced reliability violations.
Definition 2.6. The quantity that represents the susceptibility of a digital system to
reliability violations is called a reliability metric.
Exhaustive enumeration of reliability metrics is beyond the scope of this survey.
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Fig. 1. The chain of events from a physical mechanism to a user-perceived failure.
Definition 2.7. The term reliability concern will be used as a generic term to refer
collectively to both reliability violations and reliability metrics.
If we inspect the reliability violations and metrics that are present in the literature,
we can make a distinction based on the nature of these reliability concerns.
Definition 2.8. Functional reliability concerns deal with the correctness of the binary
digits that are stored, processed, or communicated within and across systems.
A functional reliability violation is the soft error [Mukherjee 2008]—that is, the bi-
nary corruption of a node (e.g., of the bit in a static random accessmemory (SRAM) cell).
As for reliability metrics, a functional example is the bit error rate (BER), describing
the percentage of bits that may be erroneous within a stream of data.
Definition 2.9. A parametric reliability concern refers either to operation margins of
the digital system or a black box within the former. These may be related to the timing
or quality cost (e.g., total energy) of that system or black box.
A good example of parametric reliability violations is the fluctuation of a pMOSFET’s
threshold voltage (Vth) due to negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) [Grasser
et al. 2011]. From a reliability metric viewpoint, a good example is the static-noise
margin (SNM), which illustrates the voltage margin of an SRAM cell, beyond which
the cell becomes unstable [Seevinck et al. 1987] (i.e., prone to “bit flips”).
Next, we define three key terms that connect the chain of events from a physical phe-
nomenon to a malfunction that is perceived by the end user. A schematic presentation
of these terms is given in Figure 1. The following three terms are reliability violations
(see Definition 2.5) and are presented in descending order of severity.
Definition 2.10. A failure is an undesired behavior or result delivered by a digital
system. It is perceived by the end user and violates the system’s specifications.
The end user may be any party that cooperates with the system under test in a
sequential arrangement. We will assume that the service provided by the system is
specified in a complete way by the constraints of its end user. As a result, failures due
to inadequate system specifications are out of scope [Avizienis et al. 2004].
Definition 2.11. An error is an abstract condition “that may lead to a failure”
[Avizienis et al. 2004]. The failure manifestation is a result of the error propagating
across abstraction levels of a system. In case no failure arises, the error is masked.
The abstract nature of the system condition contains no information about the un-
derlying physics of the error. Examples of such conditions are corrupt binary values or
an unspecified state in the finite state machine (FSM) of the system.
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Definition 2.12. Based on Avizienis et al. [2004], a fault is defined as the “adjudged
or hypothesized” physical condition of a system and is the cause of an error.
Unlike errors and failures, the fault contains information about the underlying
physics of a malfunction. It is restricted to a small region of the digital system (e.g., a
handful of devices), whereas the error involves a larger subset. Examples of faults are
shifts in the threshold voltage of a transistor (Vth) or a reduced critical charge (Qcrit)
[Roche et al. 1999] of an SRAM cell. A fault remains inactive until the respective HW
component gets involved in system operation. Once the fault is activated, an error is
triggered. A fault may also be naturally corrected before it is activated.
Definition 2.13. Reliability analysis of a digital system is the monitoring of the
system’s performance under the presence of reliability violations.
Reliability violations are injected in the system either naturally, through the oper-
ating conditions, or artificially by manipulating the ported SW or regions of the HW.
The choice between fault or error injection depends on the complexity of the injection
procedure and the target abstraction level. Finally, the direct injection of failures in
the digital system would be less useful, because the user-specified constraints are vi-
olated on injection. Monitoring of the system during reliability analysis may address
functional and parametric reliability violations with various degrees of severity. Fur-
thermore, the propagation of a reliability violation to higher abstraction levels is also
detected. With reliability analysis, we can estimate the portion of the injected faults
that become activated (i.e., become errors) within a digital system. More details about
the possible injection and detection techniques are presented in Section 4.
Definition 2.14. Reliability modeling involves the derivation of a formal expression
for a reliability metric of a well-defined digital system (see Definitions 2.1 through 2.3).
During a reliability analysis phase, we monitor the occurrence of errors or fail-
ures. These measurements yield correlations between reliability metrics and the usage
profile (i.e., models). Models of reliability metrics can be used for analysis at higher
abstraction levels, usually with a HW description. We present the interaction between
analysis and modeling in Section 3.2. Modeling options are presented Section 5.
2.2. Related Classification Work
By inspecting classification and survey papers related to our target domain, it is ev-
ident that reliability analysis and modeling are of major importance to the research
community and industry. Two classification trends are observed, which reside in the
vicinity of the reliability analysis and modeling domains. Through the evaluation of
these works, the optimality and novelty of our classification can be substantiated.
2.2.1. Term Classifications. Papers that are dedicated exclusively to terminology are
quite rare. In many cases, we see a bank of definitions that accompanies a novel
approach on reliability analysis and modeling. Such classifications are important, as
they create a consistent and reusable terminology for the target research domain.
A paper in the area of reliability and dependability, mainly dedicated to terminology,
is Avizienis et al. [2004]. It classifies erroneous states and connects them through
propagation or causality relations. It maintains a system-level point of view toward
dependability and security. This makes it difficult to create connections between the
defined terms and physical phenomena that threaten the reliability of digital systems.
We must also note the addition of the security aspect—namely, malicious attacks to a
digital system. This is a valid concern for the dependability of digital systems but is not
part of our classification scope, because it is unrelated to the physical aspects as such.
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However, the security aspect of system dependability is complementary to our goals.
Overall, Avizienis et al. [2004] is a major source of terminology and illustrates digital
systems’ dependability with consistent high-level terms. We have stayed as close as
possible to those in the projection for our objectives.
A set of definitions related to bit-level corruptions induced by radiation, referred to as
soft errors, can be found in the work of Mukherjee et al. [2005]. In addition, a timeline
is presented for the possible outcomes of a bit-level corruption in a microprocessor,
where detection and mitigation are considered as well. The terms that are introduced
throughout this article cover abstraction levels from a single device (e.g., device error
rate) and range up to the architecture (e.g., propagation vulnerability factor (PVF)). The
scope of the paper includes only reliability threats from radiation sources. Furthermore,
formalized expressions are presented for the derivation of reliability metrics like the
architecture vulnerability factor (AVF) of a HW structure.
Papers that present a novel approach or technical reports that focus on a specific
application are always a valid source of term classifications. Typical examples of that
nature are safety standards, which contain dedicated chapters where terms related
to reliability analysis or modeling are defined. For example, in an introduction to the
IEC 61508 standard [Redmill 2005], a quote from the standard reads that “either
qualitative or quantitative hazard and risk analysis techniques may be used.” In
Redmill [2005], we also see definitions used in the standard, describing various degrees
of the likelihood or consequence of hazard occurrence. An entire part of the standard
is apparently dedicated to related definitions [Bell 2006]. A similar approach toward
term classification is reported for the ARP 4761 aviation standard [SAE International
1996] and the ISO 26262 automotive standard [ISO 26262-1 2011]. Finally, we need to
note that the definition of many reliability concepts dates back to very old sources, as
in the case of the “bathtub curve’ dating back to 1693 [Klutke et al. 2003]. Apparently,
a wide range of reference sources define and formulate traditional concepts related to
reliability [Ebeling 2009; Kapurl et al. 1977].
2.2.2. Review of Classifications of Existing Techniques. Another set of related work cate-
gorizes reliability analysis and modeling techniques. The injection of faults for the
assessment of digital systems reliability has yielded significant survey work. The
concept of fault injection (see Definition 2.13) involves the creation of disturbance in
a digital system (prototype or HW description) to assess the latter’s reliability.
In Hsueh et al. [1997], we find a presentation of fault injection techniques. The
basic distinction is between fault injection performed in the HW (either with or with-
out a physical contact) and in the SW (either at compilation time or at runtime).
Each type of fault injection is assessed, among other factors, in terms of cost, repeata-
bility, and controllability. State-of-the-art tools are provided for each fault injection
category. However, faults and errors are not defined in a systematic way, thus re-
ducing the generality of the claims made in this work. In addition, no information
is provided regarding the postprocessing of the data that a fault injection campaign
yields. As a result, poor connection exists between the reliability analysis andmodeling
phases.
Ziade et al. [2004] additionally introduces the simulation- and emulation-based
fault injection techniques in a more systematic way. In Benso et al. [2010], we find
a classification of fault injection techniques based on the HW versus SW distinction.
The readouts of the injection tools are also presented. In Arlat et al. [2003], we can see
four different injection techniques that have been used for the reliability assessment
of a specific fault-tolerant architecture [Kopetz et al. 1989].
The creation of formal reliability models has also received significant attention. Geist
et al. [1990] evaluate techniques used for the reliability estimation of fault-tolerant
systems. This survey initially describes the generations of reliability models from the
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N-modular redundancy model up to Markovian methods and detailed modeling of the
detection, isolation, and recovery processes. Five state-of-the-art tools for reliability
analysis are presented and evaluated based on the utilized fault and recovery models.
The required platform support and output metrics of each tool are also discussed.
In Tomek et al. [1994], we find a classification of reliability modeling approaches
motivated by a representative test case. The aspect of model calibration gives rise to
the issue of fault injection, either to a prototype or a HW description.
Finally, Lyu [2007] presents a roadmap of SW reliability. This classification work
presents reliability analysis and modeling approaches from a purely SW point of
view. Research trends and future challenges are also discussed. There is a correlation
between SW and HW reliability, but it is merely conceptual. This roadmap remains
detached from the propagation of fault effects from the HW up to the system SW and
end-user abstraction levels.
2.2.3. Assessment of Related Classifications. The existence of many related classifications
indicates the apparent need for a systematic survey of reliability analysis andmodeling.
Some terminology categorizations do not classify the underlying physical mechanisms
in a systematic way. Others are application specific. As for technique classifications,
the injection of faults for verification purposes is a topic that has received extensive
attention by the research community. However, these works feature reduced focus on
the modeling phase that usually follows an injection campaign. We have also witnessed
technique classifications that are restricted to a specific platform. Papers focusing
on reliability models present a thorough formulation of the mathematical principles.
However, there is no classification of the possible reliability violations (i.e., the physical
threats to system reliability). The same observation holds for SW reliability analysis
classifications, where the connection to the HW is scarcely existent.
In view of the related classification work, our approach differentiates itself by equally
addressing the SW and HW domains in the context of physically induced reliability
violations. We also perform a breadth-first exploration of the target research domain.
This means that we do not aim to exhaustively include all related papers (depth first)
as do typical survey papers. On the contrary, we first present all relevant categories of
the target domain and only instantiate representative works. Each cited work is briefly
analyzed so that its categorization is fully motivated. The different aspects of hybrid
works (which fall under multiple categories) are equally addressed. This results to a
complete classification framework for the target domain.
2.3. The Classification Framework Methodology
A basic tool for navigation across a target research domain is the classification frame-
work, resembling a binary tree with orthogonal splits [Kritikakou et al. 2013].
Assuming a universe set U of possible approaches on a specific topic (in our case,
reliability analysis and modeling), the classification methodology proposes a split of
this set into two complementary sets Aand B based on a specific criterion p. For every
possible approach x of the universe set, p(x) can be either 1 or 0, depending on whether
the criterion is satisfied by the possible approach or not. That way, each x is placed
under the correct A or B subset. No x can belong in both A and B. The formalization of
a single split, as proposed by our methodology is presented in Equation (1). With such
consecutive top-down splits, we end up with a classification framework, the branches
of which are created by various splitting criteria. In other words, we perform the same
splitting procedure in each of the derived sets A, B and carry on in an inductive way.
The criterion chosen for each split results in strictly complementary branches. The
lowest-level branches, or leaves, of the framework are the derived categories of the
initial domain. These categories are not independent. Constraints are propagated be-
tween each pair in a split, which determines how to proceed in each of the two branches.
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Thus, that also implies an ordering to use them. In that respect, we can see them as
“constraint orthogonal” to each other. The levels of splitting define the abstraction
levels of the framework. Each state-of-the-art work is mapped to the framework leaf,
where it bears the most resemblance in terms of assumptions and/or implementation:
U = {x : x is a possible approach}
A= {x ∈ U : p(x) = 1}
B= {x ∈ U : p(x) = 0}
A∩ B= ∅ and A∪ B= U
(1)
The completeness of the classification framework is based on the property A∩ B= ∅
of Equation (1), which refers to categorization of possible approaches on the topic in
question. This property propagates to the leaves of the classification framework. It
is obvious that real approaches cannot comply entirely with the preceding property.
Apparently, it is possible to identify state-of-the-art works that can be placed under
more than one leaf of the classification framework. This is acceptable, because research
involves assumptions that relax the complementarity constraint to all other possible
approaches on the topic in question. When categorizing such a hybrid work, we will
analyze the aspect of that work that conforms to the appropriate framework leaf.
A simple illustration of the splits performed for the creation of a classification frame-
work can be seen in Figure 2. In this example, we use criteria p, q, and r to create the
framework of Figure 2(a). The partitioning of all the possible approaches into subsets
can be seen in Figures 2(b) through 2(d). Once we have reached the leaves of the frame-
work, we populate it with state-of-the-art works. Some of these works may be hybrid,
as illustrated in Figure 2(d), and are suitable for more than one leaf of the framework.
3. CLASSIFICATION OVERVIEW
3.1. Primitive Classification Frameworks
Here we provide frameworks that alleviate the complexity of the state-of-the-art cate-
gorization, as they are reusable in a hierarchical way. We instantiate them in the final
classification frameworkwith a single nodewherever necessary. Primitive classification
frameworks can also illustrate the definitions of Section 2.1.
3.1.1. Digital System Instantiation. In Section 2.1, we defined the HW, SW, and operating
conditions as the three components of a digital system. Here, we provide a reusable
classification framework for the definition of the digital system based on its three
components. The idea is that we split each component to its two possible instantiations
based on the respective definitions of Section 2.1. That way, before delving into the
classification of the analysis and modeling techniques, we have a systematic way with
which to create a consistent definition of any digital system.
These simple splits are presented in Figure 3(a). As stated earlier, the HWmay exist
either in a pure HW form or an equivalent HW description. The SW of a digital system
can be either service specific or generic. Finally, the operating conditions include the
interference either fromneighboring systems or other natural stimuli. A valid boundary
with which to distinguish systems that are neighboring to the system under test is the
packaging. As a result, any black boxes that are included in the packaging of the
inspected system are assumed to be members of the system under test. All black boxes
that reside outside this packaging are assumed to be neighboring systems.
A digital system definition based on these three classification frameworks will be
compatible with the splitting criteria that are used for our entire classification. A digital
system definition in a state-of-the-art approach may also be hybrid. For example, the
SW of a digital system contains both generic and service-specific components.
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Fig. 2. Example of our classification framework methodology.
3.1.2. Black Box Identification. In many cases of reliability analysis or modeling, we need
to reach a specific abstraction level of the HW of a digital system (in the form of pure
HW or a HW description). In other words, we are looking for a black box within this
system. Based on Definition 2.4, we can identify any black box’s I/O nodes and either
observe or control them. The observability is related to the detection of faults or errors,
whereas the controllability refers to the injection of faults or errors to the system. To
identify black boxes within a digital system, we need to check whether a component
connection scheme is available.
If that is the case, we search for black boxes within this digital system (can be either
components or intercomponent communication channels). In the opposite case, we can
only assume the entire digital system as a black box and perceive it by its I/O. The
concept of identifying black boxes is reusable across the field of reliability analysis and
modeling and is presented as a reusable classification framework in Figure 3(b).
3.1.3. Type of Reliability Violation. Definitions 2.10 through 2.12 deal with the escalation
of a reliability violation from a physical mechanism (i.e., fault) up to a user-perceived
malfunction (i.e., failure). Figure 3(c) presents the primitive classification framework
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Fig. 3. Primitive classification frameworks.
for the type of reliability violations. The first splitting criterion is the perception by the
end user, thus distinguishing failures from the errors and faults. The representation
of an abstract erroneous system state distinguishes an error from a fault.
3.1.4. Nature of Reliability Concerns. In Definitions 2.8 and 2.9, we have made a dis-
tinction between functional and parametric reliability concerns, respectively. The term
concernmay refer to a type of reliability violation (i.e., fault, error, or failure). Alterna-
tively, a reliability concern may refer to the metric that is used to quantify the propa-
gation extent of a reliability violation. In any case, the distinction between functional
and parametric reliability concerns is complete. On the one hand, we have parametric
reliability concerns, referring to fluctuations of reliable operation margins or service
specifications (i.e., quality cost or timing). On the other hand, we have functional reli-
ability concerns, which involve either denial of service or binary corruption (e.g., of a
memory cell). This reusable classification framework is depicted in Figure 3(d).
Based on Definition 2.12, a fault contains mostly a parametric information. A func-
tional reliability concern deals with binary correctness, so it is very difficult to charac-
terize a fault as functional. Faults contain no binary or system abstractions. We will
mostly find the term fault paired with the parametric nature of reliability violations.
3.2. Reliability Analysis Versus Reliability Modeling
Having presented fundamental terminology and reusable classification frameworks,
we can start presenting the state-of-the-art categorization. This section introduces the
high-level splits of the classification framework. The resulting branches are covered
in the next two sections. Here, we will also reflect on the constraint dependencies
between these two branches. As indicated by the title of the article, the first split in
the assessment of physically induced reliability threats to digital systems yields two
major research domains–namely, reliability analysis and reliability modeling. Even
though these branches are complementary between them (see Definitions 2.13 and
2.14), it is important to distinguish the interaction between these two domains in
real applications. During the reliability analysis phase, we gather data about system
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Fig. 4. Horizontal constraint propagation from analysis to modeling; constraints also propagate vertically
across abstraction levels.
performance under a variety of usage profiles. During reliability modeling, we will
search for and formulate correlations between the system’s usage profile (i.e., combi-
nation of SW workload and operating conditions) and the quantities measured during
the analysis. Here lies an opportunity to use a reliability model—that is, a formulated
correlation between a reliability metric and system usage—for the calibration of re-
liability analysis at a higher abstraction level. In other words, instead of performing
the reliability analysis with real disturbance of the operating conditions, we can create
fault or error artifacts using a reliability model that has already been created at lower
abstraction levels. As a result, we identify two flows of information:
(1) Major information flow: Reliability analysis data about system performance under
a variety of usage profiles are passed to themodeling phase in search of correlations
that will create reliability models.
(2) Minor information flow: A reliability model calibrates a reliability analysis cam-
paign at a higher abstraction level. The calibration may involve the aggression of
fault or error injection in lieu of actual faults or errors occurring in the system.
In view of this interaction, it is important to understand the constraint propagation
between analysis and modeling. By nature of these two phases, the major information
flow occurs from the reliability analysis to modeling. Hence, constraints are propa-
gated “horizontally” at each abstraction level. The minor information flow happens
in a “vertical way” between abstraction levels so that it does not cause any cycle or
mutual dependence. In Figure 4, we illustrate this concept for a wide variety of ab-
straction levels. Following the same logic as the abstraction level ascends, we can
perform consecutive modeling and analysis attempts reaching the entire digital sys-
tem. In each step, analysis data create models used to calibrate reliability analysis at
higher abstraction levels. Usually, the latter is performed with HW descriptions, as in
technology computer-aided design (TCAD) [Buturla 1991], SPICE [Nagel et al. 1973],
VHDL [IEEE 2000], or Verilog [IEEE 2012a] and SystemC [IEEE 2012b] (in ascending
order of abstraction according to the Y-chart [Gajski et al. 1983]).
The specific level of abstractionwhere analysis ormodeling takes place is another dis-
tinguishing factor between samples of prior art. The aforementioned Y-chart (Figure 5)
will be used to identify the specific abstraction level and representation where each
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Fig. 5. Representations and abstraction levels in digital system design.
Fig. 6. The three initials levels of the binary classification presented in this article.
cited work resides. To make our classification more complete, we introduce three ex-
tra abstraction levels: gate and transistor level in the structural representation and
machine code level in the functional representation (underlined in Figure 5).
Having covered the interaction between reliability analysis and reliability modeling
across abstraction levels, we turn to each of these two branches and perform fur-
ther splits in a top-down fashion. In Figure 6, we present the three initial levels of
our binary classification. In the analysis domain, we distinguish two complementary
steps—namely, the injection and detection of reliability violations. Each one is further
split based on the criterion of pure HW availability. In the complementary modeling
case, we distinguish between environment- and platform-inherent violations. The for-
mer case is further split in terms of the origin of the environmental interference (i.e.,
neighboring HW or natural stimuli). The latter branch is split between defective man-
ufacturing or a specific usage profile that amplifies certain reliability violations. Due
to the exponential growth of the classification framework, we deal with each of the
analysis and modeling branches separately in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
At the reliability analysis phase, the digital system activity is monitored under specific
SW workload and operating conditions (see Definition 2.13). This section will address
the splits of the analysis branch in a top-down fashion, mirroring the classification
framework methodology. Reliability violations—namely, faults, errors, and failures (in
ascending order of severity according to Definitions 2.10 through 2.12)—are present
in the system during the reliability analysis. These violations are either naturally
occurring or artificially injected. In any case, a subset of these violations needs to be
detected to provide data for the next modeling phase. As a result, the initial split of the
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Fig. 7. Classification of possible techniques for the injection part of reliability analysis.
reliability analysis branch is between injection and detection of reliability violations.
Each one will be presented in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
4.1. Injection
The first step of reliability analysis requires the creation of reliability violations within
the digital system (i.e., faults, errors, and failures). In reality, physical mechanisms are
the ones that trigger the escalation up to a user-perceived fundamental malfunction.
However, it is also acceptable to create artifacts of reliability violations (of varying
severity based on Definitions 2.10 through 2.12) for analysis purposes. This section
will cover all possible approaches with respect to the injection of such violations. This
part of the classification framework can be seen in Figure 7. The first splitting criterion
is based on the availability of the digital system’s HW (see Figure 3(a)). This yields two
branches, one for pure HW and one for the case of a HW description.
4.1.1. HW Physically Available. In case the HW is physically available, we can inject reli-
ability violations either by directly contacting the HW under test or without a physical
conduction path. This distinction yields a pair of branches at a lower abstraction level.
In case we opt to physically connect to the target system, we can check for black
boxes that are controllable. The inputs of these black boxes, assuming that they are
controllable, can be used for the injection of reliability violations. To identify such black
boxes, the generic classification framework of Figure 3(b) can be used.
Example 4.1. A representative example of injection to pure HW through contact
is the Advanced Fault Injection Tool (AFIT) [Martı´nez et al. 1999]. This tool enforces
disruptive signals through probes to nodes of a prototype.
The alternative option is to implement injector modules in the HW of the digital
system under test. These additional pure HW regions are exclusively dedicated to the
creation of disturbance that will cause reliability violations in the pure HW. In general,
the addition of extra pure HW in a system, even for injection purposes, has to be
assessed in terms of the underlying design and manufacturing overhead.
Example 4.2. Pure HW modules for injection purposes are used in Karlsson et al.
[1995]. This paper presents the validation of a maintainable real-time system (Mars
[Kopetz et al. 1989]). EMI is created in the pins of the prototype using additional
antenna wires.
If we choose to inject reliability violations without a contact, the only remaining
components that can be used are its operating conditions and ported SW. In the former
case, we can manipulate the natural interferences that surround the digital system,
thus creating the desired level of reliability violations. In the latter case, alterations
can occur to generic or service-specific SW that is executed on the digital system.
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Example 4.3. Injection through the manipulation of operating conditions is used
in the case of Velazco et al. [1991], where the prototype is irradiated in a vacuum to
evaluate its sensitivity to single event upsets (SEUs).
Example 4.4. Manipulation of ported SW for injection purposes on pure HW is seen
in Wei et al. [2012]. SW executed on real multicore systems is injected with bit flips
to cause artifacts of silent data corruptions (SDCs). The injected SW is used for the
evaluation of an invariance-based detection technique.
4.1.2. HW in a Description Form. When pure HW is unavailable, we have to limit our-
selves to a HW description. Without it, injection of reliability violations cannot be
performed. A HW description is executable and allows alterations—in our case, for the
injection of reliability violations. In addition, a simulation/emulation tool that executes
the HW description can be enhanced to enable injection of reliability violations. In case
we choose to make HW description alterations for injection purposes, we can either
designate controllable black boxes or create additional injection modules.
Example 4.5. An example of black box controllability assessment is found in Shafik
et al. [2008]. This work presents an injection technique based on a SystemC description
of a digital system. The main concept behind the technique is the alteration of signal
and data types to composite “fault injection enabler” types. That way, the intrusion
overhead of the injection process is minimized.
Example 4.6. In Civera et al. [2001], we see the creation of SEU artifacts through
the alteration of target system’s VHDL representation.
If we choose to leave the HW description unaltered, the only components that can
be used for injection of reliability violations are the SW executed on the HW descrip-
tion and the tool that emulates/simulates the HW description. In the former case, we
manipulate the binary of the ported application to emulate reliability violations. In
the latter case, we enhance the simulator/emulator tool to enable the controllability of
the executed HW description. Given that the HW is in a description form, it would be
meaningless to manipulate the operating condition for injection purposes, as the HW is
not physically present. The cases where the HW description is emulated or simulated
under artificial operating conditions correspond to the previous branch—namely, ma-
nipulation of theHWdescription. In such cases, artifacts of special operating conditions
are created using existing features of the emulator/simulator (e.g., SPICE simulation
for a specific temperature) and not by adding new ones.
Example 4.7. Emulator/simulator enhancement for injection purposes is featured in
Ragel et al. [2006]. Bit flips are injected at the instruction level of a processor to verify
a proposed monitoring technique. Injection of bit flips occurs by corrupting bits of the
memory where the set of instructions is stored, after application porting. To enable
this injection, the authors have modified the SimpleScalar tool set [Burger et al. 1997].
Similarly, “one-clock-cycle” delay can be added in to the erroneous black box to cause
timing violations [Li et al. 2009].
Example 4.8. Application binary modification can be seen in Mao et al. [2010].
This work presents a secure processing methodology for embedded systems. The target
platform is simulated (HW description form). Artifacts of erroneous states are created
by creating bit flips in the application binary.
Wenote that the context of the preceding paper ismalicious attacks, which fall beyond
our scope (Section 1). However, this is still a representative example, as corruption of
single bits is a valid artifact of physically induced violations (e.g., soft error).
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Fig. 8. Classification of possible techniques for the detection of reliability violations.
4.1.3. Type and Nature of Injected Reliability Violation. We have covered the possible ap-
proaches toward the injection of reliability violations in a digital system. We have
explored all components of the digital system that can be manipulated to create either
real or artificial reliability violations. Some of the approaches involve alterations in the
HW or SW of the system. Others involve the manipulation of the operating conditions.
In any case, the nature of the injected reliability violation (see Definitions 2.8 and 2.9)
also needs to be addressed. Furthermore, the possible injection approaches have to be
connectedwith the type of reliability violation (seeDefinitions 2.10 through 2.12) that is
being injected in each approach. For that purpose, we require the reusable classification
frameworks of Figures 3(c) and 3(d). These reusable concepts can be instantiated in
each leaf of the injection classification framework. For example, if we are to manipulate
the operating conditions for the sake of injection, the type of violation that is injected
is a fault, as only the underlying physical mechanism is triggered. Alternatively, if
we choose to inject reliability violations by manipulating the HW description of a
digital system, we are free to inject either faults or errors based on the features of the
available simulator/emulator. Each of the injected violations can be either parametric
or functional depending on the target physical mechanism. Table I summarizes the
nature and type of injected reliability violations for each cited work. We also reflect on
the digital system abstraction and representation in each case.
4.2. Detection
Having injected faults or errors in a digital system, we need to detect their impact
across various abstraction levels. This detection provides information about the degree
of propagation and the percentage of the injected violations that lead to user-perceived
malfunctions (i.e., failures). That way, we can gathermeasurements and try to correlate
them to the SWworkload and operating conditions that have been applied to the digital
system under test. The latter stage is equivalent to reliability modeling and will be
covered in Section 5. The physical availability of the system’s HW is chosen again as
the initial splitting criterion for the detection branches. The HW of the digital system
may be physically present (pure HW) or instantiated as a HW description (Figure 8).
4.2.1. Pure HW. Given that the system is physically implemented, we can turn either
to pure HW or SW utilities to detect reliability violations. In the pure HW case, we can
either assess the observability of target black boxes or incorporate detection modules
within the system. The former option requires the application of black box exploration
in the pure HW as outlined by the classification framework of Figure 3(b). The latter
option, as in the case of injection, introduces a manufacturing overhead.
Example 4.9. Velazco et al. [1991] illustrate the observability assessment of pureHW
black boxes for detection purposes. A pair of microprocessors are tested for tolerance
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against SEUs. Part of the verification process involves the detection of user-perceived
reliability violations by comparing the results of the irradiated pure HW with a set of
reference values. Black box observability is also employed for the analysis of “voltage
noise in production processors” [Reddi et al. 2011].
Example 4.10. Velazco et al. [1991] use additional pure HWmodules (on the system
and as peripherals) for detection purposes. Built-in detection schemes have been used
to classify internal erroneous states by their identification messages. Similar detector
modules are observed in the evaluation of Fault-Tolerant Architecture with Stable
Storage Technology (FASST) [Martı´nez et al. 1999].
Velazco et al. [1991] is an example of a hybrid paper, as it is categorized under two
neighboring detection leaves. This work features detection of reliability violations on
pure HW both by observing black boxes of the HW and by utilizing built-in detector
modules. Furthermore, we have seen an instantiation of this paper in Example 4.3,
which is strictly related to the injection of reliability violations to pure HW. A simi-
lar observation holds for Martı´nez et al. [1999], which contains aspects both from the
injection and detection of reliability violations. In Example 4.1, we identified the in-
jection of reliability violations to pure HW and without a contact for this paper. We
also identify the respective detection technique (Example 4.10), which is based on the
detection modules that are implemented within the system under test.
When SW is chosen for detection purposes, we can choose between generic SW utili-
ties or utilities that are related to a specific service delivered by the system.
Example 4.11. An example for the generic SW case is Wei et al. [2012]. A moni-
toring thread tracks branch instructions across threads and assesses the instructions’
correctness. Invariant attributes shared between threads are derived at compile time
and are used as reference for comparisons at runtime.
Wei et al. [2012] is an example of a hybrid paper. It has also been instantiated in
Example 4.4 for the case of injection directly to pure HW by manipulating ported SW.
Example 4.12. The alternative case of detection using service-specific SW can be
observed in Kim et al. [2009]. A fault-tolerant streaming engine is presented. The
paper refers to virtual application streaming and aims to protect it against network
failures. To enable this protection, the connection manager of the client is enhanced to
detect network failures and initiate the fault-tolerant scheme, thus avoiding streaming
outage on the client’s side.
4.2.2. HW Description. If we use the HW description for detection purposes, we can
either assess the observability of the design’s black boxes or introduce additional de-
tection modules. In the former case, the observability of a design’s black boxes depends
highly on its complexity as well as the capabilities of the verification tool that is used
(e.g., emulator or simulator of the HW description).
Example 4.13. A paper illustrating the observability assessment of a HW descrip-
tion’s black boxes is Civera et al. [2001]. The detection of SEU artifacts is achieved by
observing the primary output of the system and comparing to a reference. The memory
elements are checked at the end of each simulation in case a mismatch is observed with
the expected stored values. In the first case, the assumed black box is the entire system,
and its output is simply observed. In the second, we narrow down to the memory of the
system.
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Civera et al. [2001] is another hybrid paper that shares features of the injection and
detection domains. It has also been instantiated in Example 4.6 as a representative
case for injection of reliability violations using HW-described injector modules.
Example 4.14. The addition of extra modules in a HWdescription for the detection of
reliability violations is illustrated in Fei et al. [2007]. This paper presents a scheme that
aims to guarantee code integrity, especially in the presence of code injection attacks
or binary corruption from cosmic particles. The idea is to have a table of hash values
for code blocks of the running application in advance and compare them to the value
derived at runtime. Other approaches employ comparison of the application’s course of
action with an a priori–derived monitoring graph [Mao et al. 2010; Meixner et al. 2008].
Mao et al. [2010] has also been instantiated in Example 4.8 (hybrid work), where the
aspect of functional error injection in a HW description is raised.
In case we choose the SW that is ported on the HWdescription for detection purposes,
we can opt for generic SW (e.g., OS utilities) or SW that is connected to a specific service
delivered by the system (e.g., device driver).
Example 4.15. The use of service nonspecific SW for detection is observed in Ragel
et al. [2006]. This paper proposes a framework for the mitigation of soft errors or code
injection attacks on a specific instruction set architecture (ISA). The ISA has beenmod-
ified so that the checksums can be decrypted and confirmed at runtime. Additionally, in
Fei et al. [2007] processor operations beneath the instruction abstraction level (“micro-
operations”) are added to enable the comparison of hash values for the detection of
corrupt basic blocks of the execution trace.
Fei et al. [2007] is another hybrid paper. In Example 4.14, we instantiated it for extra
HW description modules, enabling the detection of corrupt instructions.
Example 4.16. Finally, the detection of reliability violations using service specific
SW (ported on a HW description) is observed in Geist et al. [2002]. This paper presents
algorithms that have embedded fault-tolerant features. In one class of such algorithms,
the units of execution (UEs) share local information to deliver their result. If a faulty
UE is identified (one that seizes to send results), it is removed from the respective
“neighborhoods.”
4.2.3. Nature and Type of Detected Reliability Violations. With the preceding splits, we
have covered all possible ways of reliability violation detection in a digital system. We
explore the types and natures of detected reliability violations using the classification
frameworks of Figures 3(c) and 3(d) (Table II). We also perform an abstraction-level
evaluation of each cited work according to Figure 5. It is important to note that it
will always be meaningful to detect reliability violations at least one abstraction level
higher than the ones injected in the digital system. Detection at the abstraction level
of the injection phase will always lead to a tautology, because the reliability violations
that are present in the system are always known in advance. A representative example
of this concept is shown in [Evans et al. 2012a], where binary corruption is injected
in the flip-flops of an ASIC design and detected reliability violations reside in a much
higher abstraction level.
5. RELIABILITY MODELING
In the previous section, we presented all possible approaches to the reliability analysis
of a digital system. First, we explored the injection of reliability violations in a system.
The impact (e.g., propagation) of these violations is detected during system operation.
For example, the percentage of violations that cause user-perceived malfunctions can
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Fig. 9. Possible modeling approaches for environment-inherent reliability threats.
be tracked. Such information needs to be postprocessed to create formal correlations
between the usage profile applied to the system and its reliability. This is performed
during reliability modeling (see Definition 2.14).
The initial distinction refers to the source of the reliability violations—namely, the
physical mechanism that lies under the target reliability violation. A valid distinction
of that sort is between environmentally inherent mechanisms and the ones that are
rooted within the physical boundaries of the system platform. In Section 3.1.1, we
designated the packaging of a digital system as a valid physical boundary. As a result,
any interference coming beyond the system packaging is considered environmental.
All other mechanisms are assumed to occur within the platform. The former branch
will be covered in Section 5.1 and the latter in Section 5.2.
5.1. Environment-Inherent Reliability Violations
This part of the modeling classification deals with the reliability models for violations
that are rooted in the environment of the system. We can further split between in-
terference from neighboring HW or actually natural stimuli. In the former case, we
incorporate all sorts of interaction between systems. In the latter case, we include
all mechanisms that happen by nature in the “ecosystem” of the system under test
without originating from another system. The classification of modeling techniques for
environmentally inherent reliability violations is illustrated in Figure 9.
5.1.1. Originating from Neighboring HW. In the case of interference from a neighboring
system (a system beyond the packaging boundaries of the system under test), we
can check whether any functional correlation is present between the system and its
neighbors (i.e., an interdependence may exist for all systems to be able to operate). In
case the system under test is functionally dependent to neighboring systems, an I/O
dependency can be present, as in the case of systems connected in series.
Example 5.1. Srivaree-ratana et al. [1998] performs reliability modeling for a set
of systems that are functionally correlated through the exchange of data. This work
formulates the “probability that all nodes can communicate with all other nodes.” A
trained artificial neural network (ANN) illustrates the correlation of network reliability
with the reliability of the network’s links and its topology.
Alternatively, the two systems (the one under test and its neighbor) may be correlated
in terms of resource provision. In some cases, this refers to supply from the electrical
grid. Such power engineering issues are considered out of the scope of our survey (see
Section 1). However, the domain of battery-powered embedded systems presents an
excellent source from which to draw relevant papers. In such designs, a battery is
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a separate package than the processor or any intellectual property (IP) block. This
domain is fully compatible to our formulation of the current leaf.
Example 5.2. More specifically, the approach of power deregulation presents in-
teresting reliability considerations for the target design [Kim et al. 2007]. Battery
degradation models are used to determine the output battery voltage as a function
of time and variable workload. These models are used to impose constraints on the
allowed frequency that can be applied to the processor of the embedded system.
When the neighboring system is not functionally coupled to the system under test,
the interferences we can inspect may require a conduction path. The case where a
conduction path is required for the interference to reach the digital system narrows
down to heat transfer. The complementary branch deals with inter-HW radiation.
Example 5.3. For the case of inter-HW heat transfer, the automotive industry is a
valid source of representative papers. In Bharathan et al. [2008], we can see an attempt
to find the optimal air cooling for power electronics used in the automotive domain and
especially hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs).
Example 5.4. As for inter-HW radiation, a representative modeling paper is Chen
et al. [2011]. It targets the interference between wireless communication infrastruc-
tures. A “simulation model for adjacent-channel interference in IEEE 802.11b net-
works” is presented that is compatible with the OMNeT++ framework [Varga et al.
2008]. The reliability metric is the packet delivery ratio (PDR).
5.1.2. Originating from Natural Stimuli. Apart from neighboring systems, nature may also
provide a lot of interference that can cause reliability violations to digital systems.
Again, we check whether nature is functionally coupled to the system under test. If
such a functional coupling exists, the next split can be again between I/O dependency
(namely, the use of natural stimuli as a source of information) and resource provision.
In the former branch (I/O dependency), the area of sensors contains many examples
where natural stimuli function as sources of information and interference for a system.
Example 5.5. A representative example of that concept is Andrei et al. [2004].
Different resistance components of the sensor have been evaluated after thermal aging
at 150◦C. For this paper, the natural stimulus that is source of information for the
system is the applied pressure. The ambient temperature is another natural stimulus,
which interferes with the system.
In the case of resource provision, renewable energy sources formass power production
are outside the scope of this article, as they refer to power engineering (providing
resources to the power grid). However, the emerging domain of energy harvesting for
small-scale grids or even embedded systems features significant research that can be
classified under the leaf in question. In this domain, natural stimuli (e.g., solar or
kinetic energy) are used as a means to power digital systems [Benecke et al. 2012]. A
representative application is wireless sensor networks [Raghunathan et al. 2005].
Example 5.6. A very representative sample of prior art deals with the modeling
of cooperating nodes of a solar, energy harvesting, wireless sensor network to devise
“error control schemes” [Jalali et al. 2012]. In this process, there is modeling of the
energy efficiency versus reliability trade-off.
If nature is uncorrelated to the system under test, we can further distinguish based
on whether a conduction path is required for the natural interference to reach the
digital systemunder test. The branch that requires a conduction path is narrowed down
to heat transfer. The complementary branch deals with the operation under particle
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Fig. 10. Possible modeling approaches for platform-inherent reliability threats.
interference. To the best of our knowledge, reliability modeling due to heat transfer is
always related to specific applications that involve elevated temperatures. Greenwell,
et al. [2011] illustrate the extreme temperatures observed in various aspects of the
automotive domain (e.g., HEVs, as discussed earlier for Bharathan et al. [2008]). In
the majority of the heat transfer modeling papers, it is neighboring HW that creates
the extreme temperatures. We can populate the current leaf with modeling attempts
that concentrate on heat transfer from the ambient environment while agnostic of the
neighboring HW or the specific “ecosystem” where the digital system is operating.
Example 5.7. Andrei et al. [2004] concentrate on the ambient temperature of the
system under test while agnostic on other “background” systems. The response of this
system is assessed for various degrees of thermal aging.
Andrei et al. [2004] is another hybrid paper, as it borrows elements from two possible
approaches toward reliability modeling. In Example 5.5, we see how this work conforms
to the modeling of reliability violations due to natural interference (temperature) for a
system that also processes natural signals (pressure sensor).
Example 5.8. Naseer et al. [2007] is a representative reliability modeling work on
particle interference. It deals with the critical charge (Qcrit) of submicron SRAM cells.
BER values are presented for different irradiation scenarios (CREME96 tool [Tylka
et al. 1997]). Modeling of particle interference are also presented in [Baumann 2005].
A correlation is made between SRAM soft error rate (SER) and the target technology
node. Gordon et al. [2004] present the modeling of particle flux for different particle
energies and geographical regions.
5.2. Platform-Inherent Reliability Violations
In this domain of reliability modeling, we are dealing with violations rooted within the
digital system’s physical boundaries. The impact of the underlying physical mechanism
may propagate to the end user. As a result, a valid criterion for the first split in
this subdomain is whether the responsible mechanisms are caused by manufacturing
defects or are occurring because of specific system utilization (Figure 10).
5.2.1. Violations Depending on Manufacturing. We can further split based on the time in-
stance at which the effects of these mechanisms (i.e., the respective faults) become
apparent. This distinction yields the time-zero and evolving mechanisms branches.
When the platform-inherent physical mechanisms cause reliability violations from
time-zero, we can have time-zero device variability, which can be either systematic or
fully random. Variability does not make the system completely dysfunctional; however,
its impact can be perceived from time-zero.
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Example 5.9. For the case of systematic variability, a representative modeling at-
tempt is found in Gupta et al. [2004]. This paper focuses on across chip linewidth
variation (ACLV) for the polysilicon level. It presents a tool that models the timing
of a circuit under systematic variations. There is also reference to the Bossung plot
[Bossung 1977], which is a commonly used graph correlating line width with the de-
focus condition during processing. The authors report a reduction of timing analysis
uncertainty even by 40% compared to traditional methods.
Example 5.10. Ye et al. [2011] deal with the modeling of fully random variabil-
ity. It models random dopant fluctuation (RDF) and line-edge roughness (LER). The
presented methodology uses compact modeling and SPICE simulations instead. An ex-
ample of the reliability metrics modeled with this tool is the standard deviation of the
threshold voltage (σVth), which is correlated to the transistor width. A similar sample
of prior art is the VariaSim tool [Romanescu et al. 2007].
In the complementary branch lie the mechanisms that are triggered during man-
ufacturing and have a perceivable impact on system operation, only as its lifetime
progresses. That impact cannot be perceived at time-zero. Some of these mechanisms
are irreversible—namely, their impact is strictly increasing with system lifetime. Other
mechanisms are evolving during the system lifetime, but they contain a partially re-
versible feature—that is, their impact is partially revoked during the system lifetime.
These two types create the branches of the current split.
Example 5.11. An example of accumulating physical mechanisms that may cause
reliability violations is time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB). A modeling at-
tempt can be found in Kimura [1999]. A series of experimental measurements yields
formal correlations between the cumulative failure of the tested devices and TDDB
intensity metrics. Similarly, Srinivasan et al. [2004] illustrate the impact of scaling on
TDDB and electromigration (EM).
Example 5.12. A representative modeling attempt of partially reversible physical
mechanisms has been made for NBTI in Kaczer et al. [2010]. This paper correlates
the activity of interface traps (which capture and emit minority carriers in the de-
vice channel) with the fluctuations caused to the threshold voltage (Vth) of submicron
pMOSFETs. A percolation model is created to mirror the “variations in the local poten-
tial” found in the channel of pMOSFET.
5.2.2. Violations Depending on System Utilization. When the utilization of the system is
the source of reliability violations, we can check whether the user can have any con-
trol over the way that the system is utilized. If that is not the case, we can look into
pure HW utilization, as a result of the system’s operation. This branch is static in
nature in the sense that the user has no control over the way that the HW is uti-
lized. The complementary branch refers to user-controlled HW utilization either by
manipulating the ported SW or by configuring the HW utilization options. In other
words, there is a set of “knobs” at the user’s disposal that allow HW utilization adjust-
ment (e.g., cutting supply to specific HW black boxes or manipulating the application
mapping).
We need to note that with the term utilization, we refer only to the way in which
HW black boxes are utilized. Operating conditions are not included in this node of
the classification framework because they have already been covered in Section 5.1,
where the various types of environmental interference to the system under test are
presented.
In case the user is unable to control the system utilization, we have to focus on the
pure HW activity. This requires a black box exploration of the system HW, which can
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be performed according to Figure 3(b). Then, we can distinguish between the two major
issues of pure HW utilization—namely, the existence of hot spots across the pure HW
and regions that exhibit a specific current or voltage activity.
Example 5.13. Regarding hot spot modeling, a representative work is Skadron et al.
[2004]. Based on the duality between an RC network and the heat transfer problem, the
authors propose a compact thermal modeling technique that uses as input the power
trace in each physical block of the system’s pure HW.
Example 5.14. In Toledano-Luque et al. [2011], experimental data illustrate the
impact that a single interface trap has on the threshold voltage Vth of the device.
Correlations are made between the gate voltage (Vgs), the occupancy probability of the
interface trap, and the final Vth value. [Ma et al. 2011] deal with “localized IR drop
analysis” by correlating IR drops occurrence with the switching activities of a set of
cells that share the same power and ground lines.
When the utilization of the HW is coupled to or configurable by the user, we assess
both the mapping utilities of the system and the actually mapped application. The
former component is generic, and the latter is coupled to a specific delivered service.
Example 5.15. In Velazco et al. [1991], different susceptibility to heavy ions is ob-
served under the same irradiation conditions but for different executed benchmark.
The irradiation impact is reduced when the benchmarks are executed with a deacti-
vated cache (mapping utility knob of the 68882 coprocessor). Similarly, in Biswas et al.
[2005], we see different AVF values for the considered benchmark applications. A pa-
per that deals with the impact of ported SW on reliability metrics is Kim et al. [2011].
This work employs a genetic algorithm to maximize the inductance impact (di/dt)
on the power delivery network (PDN). Series of instructions cause different voltage
droops to the PDN. Similarly, “a pattern of control flow and microarchitectural activ-
ity” can be correlated to emergency events related to voltage supply noise [Reddi et al.
2010].
It is interesting to observe how the work of Velazco et al. [1991] is instantiated in
many classification framework leaves. This is a valid example of a hybrid paper. It com-
bines aspects of both reliability analysis and modeling. In Section 4.1, we instantiated
this paper as a representative example fault injection to pure HW without a physical
contact and through operating conditions (Example 4.3). In Section 4.2, this work was
cited for error detection in pure HW using both built-in detector modules and primitive
output observation (Examples 4.9 and 4.10). In this section, we have completed the
presentation of this hybrid by analyzing its modeling aspects.
5.3. Nature of Modeled Reliability Metrics
In the two previous sections, we covered the modeling of a very wide range of reliability
violations. We need to explore the nature of the reliability metric that is modeled in
each case (i.e., for each leaf of the classification frameworks in Figures 9 and 10). By
employing the reusable classification framework of Figures 3(c) and (d), we identify
the type and nature of the reliability metric that is modeled in each of the cited papers
of this section. Furthermore, we assign the cited works to the abstraction levels and
representations of Figure 5. The resulting evaluation is presented in Table III.
6. DISCUSSION
Following the classification of prior art, we should reflect on the impact of the proposed
framework. Initially, we observe certain trends in the target research domain. These
observations are presented in Section 6.1. Moreover, in Section 6.2, we illustrate how
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 47, No. 3, Article 38, Publication date: February 2015.
CSUR4703-38 ACM-TRANSACTION March 9, 2015 14:24
Analysis and Modeling Classification for Physical Reliability Violations 38:25
Ta
bl
e
III
.T
yp
e
a
n
d
N
at
ur
e
o
fM
o
de
le
d
R
el
ia
bi
lity
M
e
tri
cs
:
Ab
st
ra
ct
io
n-
Le
ve
lE
va
lu
at
io
n
E
xa
m
pl
e
W
or
k
C
it
ed
T
yp
e
N
at
u
re
R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
on
A
bs
tr
ac
ti
on
D
et
ai
ls
5.
1
[S
ri
va
re
e-
ra
ta
n
a
et
al
.1
99
8]
E
P
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
S
ys
te
m
A
ll
-t
er
m
in
al
n
et
w
or
k
re
li
ab
il
it
y
fo
rm
u
la
ti
on
5.
2
[K
im
et
al
.2
00
7]
F
P
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
S
ys
te
m
B
at
te
ry
m
od
el
s
sp
ec
if
y
cl
oc
k
fr
eq
u
en
cy
5.
3
[B
h
ar
at
h
an
et
al
.2
00
8]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
L
am
in
ar
fl
ow
m
od
el
ed
fo
r
di
ff
er
en
t
h
ea
t
fl
u
xe
s
5.
4
[C
h
en
et
al
.2
01
1]
E
F
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
S
ys
te
m
P
D
R
m
od
el
ed
fo
r
va
ri
ab
le
w
ir
el
es
s
in
te
rf
er
en
ce
5.
5,
5.
7
[A
n
dr
ei
et
al
.2
00
4]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
C
ir
cu
it
C
om
po
n
en
t
re
si
st
an
ce
vs
.a
m
bi
en
t
te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
5.
6
[J
al
al
ie
t
al
.2
01
2]
F
P
F
u
n
ct
io
n
al
S
ys
te
m
E
ffi
ci
en
cy
vs
.r
el
ia
bi
li
ty
tr
ad
e-
of
f
5.
8
[N
as
ee
r
et
al
.2
00
7]
E
F
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
B
E
R
va
lu
es
vs
.d
if
fe
re
n
t
ir
ra
di
at
io
n
sc
en
ar
io
s
5.
8
[B
au
m
an
n
20
05
]
E
F
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
G
at
e
M
od
el
in
g
of
th
e
S
E
R
fo
r
S
R
A
M
ce
ll
s
5.
8
[G
or
do
n
et
al
.2
00
4]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
P
ar
ti
cl
e
fl
u
x
fo
r
di
ff
er
en
t
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
re
gi
on
s
5.
9
[G
u
pt
a
et
al
.2
00
4]
F
P
G
eo
m
et
ri
ca
l
C
el
l
T
im
in
g
an
al
ys
is
fo
r
re
pr
es
en
ta
ti
ve
ce
ll
s
5.
10
[Y
e
et
al
.2
01
1]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
σ
V
th
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
u
n
de
r
R
D
F
an
d
L
E
R
5.
10
[R
om
an
es
cu
et
al
.2
00
7]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
G
at
e
S
ta
ti
c
st
at
is
ti
ca
lt
im
in
g
si
m
u
la
ti
on
s
5.
11
[K
im
u
ra
19
99
]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
A
n
al
yt
ic
al
m
od
el
fo
r
t B
D
ba
se
d
on
T
D
D
B
im
pa
ct
5.
11
[S
ri
n
iv
as
an
et
al
.2
00
4]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
Im
pa
ct
of
sc
al
in
g
on
E
M
an
d
T
D
D
B
5.
12
[K
ac
ze
r
et
al
.2
01
0]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
V
th
fl
u
ct
u
at
io
n
s
an
d
V
th
0
va
lu
es
5.
13
[S
ka
dr
on
et
al
.2
00
4]
F
P
G
eo
m
et
ri
ca
l
L
ay
ou
t
T
h
er
m
al
m
ap
de
ri
ve
d
fr
om
m
od
u
le
po
w
er
tr
ac
es
5.
14
[T
ol
ed
an
o-
L
u
qu
e
et
al
.2
01
1]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
T
ra
n
si
st
or
V
th
fl
u
ct
u
at
io
n
s
co
rr
el
at
ed
to
V
gs
w
av
ef
or
m
5.
14
[M
a
et
al
.2
01
1]
F
P
G
eo
m
et
ri
ca
l
C
el
ls
IR
dr
op
s
vs
.a
ct
iv
it
y
of
n
ei
gh
bo
ri
n
g
ce
ll
s
5.
15
[V
el
az
co
et
al
.1
99
1]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
L
E
T
vs
.c
ro
ss
se
ct
io
n
fo
r
di
ff
er
en
t
u
sa
ge
pr
ofi
le
s
5.
15
[B
is
w
as
et
al
.2
00
5]
E
F
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
C
al
cu
la
ti
on
of
th
e
A
V
F
re
li
ab
il
it
y
m
et
ri
c
5.
15
[K
im
et
al
.2
01
1]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
S
tr
es
sm
ar
ks
ca
u
si
n
g
m
ax
im
u
m
di
/d
t
im
pa
ct
5.
15
[R
ed
di
et
al
.2
01
0]
F
P
S
tr
u
ct
u
ra
l
P
ro
ce
ss
or
R
ec
og
n
it
io
n
of
pa
tt
er
n
s
le
ad
in
g
to
vo
lt
ag
e
dr
oo
ps
N
ot
e:
O
n
ly
w
or
ks
ci
te
d
in
th
e
se
ct
io
n
ar
e
co
n
si
de
re
d.
T
yp
e
of
re
li
ab
il
it
y
vi
ol
at
io
n
s:
F,
fa
u
lt
;
E
,
er
ro
r.
N
at
u
re
of
re
li
ab
il
it
y
vi
ol
at
io
n
s:
F,
fu
n
ct
io
n
al
;
P,
pa
ra
m
et
ri
c;
N
/A
,i
n
su
ffi
ci
en
t
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 47, No. 3, Article 38, Publication date: February 2015.
CSUR4703-38 ACM-TRANSACTION March 9, 2015 14:24
38:26 D. Rodopoulos et al.
Fig. 11. Visualization of Tables I through III. A mark is placed for each cited work in the corresponding
representation and abstraction level.
the presented methodology can be reused and extended by interested readers for the
assessment of specific subdomains in reliability analysis and modeling. We use two
samples of prior art to substantiate this reusability.
6.1. Trends and Observations in Reliability Analysis and Modeling
As a result of our classification, there is a series of observations that can be made
following our inspection of prior art. Initially, we notice that state-of-the-art works are
spread across a variety of abstraction levels and system representations. Figure 11
places a mark for each cited work in the appropriate abstraction level and represen-
tation according to the enhanced Y-chart of Figure 5. We notice a concentration of
analysis techniques around the structural and functional representations. This is to
be expected, as geometry-/layout-aware analysis of integrated system reliability comes
with increased computational overheads (tools have to account for parasitic elements
in a layout-aware analysis). Geometrical phenomena are typically briefly analyzed,
and their models are used for reliability analysis experiments at higher abstraction
levels.
We can also notice a segmentation of analysis and modeling techniques across ab-
straction levels. Such techniques rarely span across more than a handful of abstraction
levels. Even though the concept of cross-layer reliability is already manifested in the
literature in the form of diverse mitigation schemes [Carter et al. 2010], it is notewor-
thy that analysis/modeling techniques have not followed a similar cross-fertilization.
We can identify certain prior art that attempts to reconcile reliability/lifetime informa-
tion across abstraction levels [Evans et al. 2012b]; however, it is difficult to identify a
vibrant cross-layer reliability analysis/modeling literature.
A major reason behind this observation lies primarily on the interfaces that are
required for reliability information to propagate from the material science and char-
acterization domain to higher levels of digital system design. This effort may succeed,
but typically the ascend does not span the entire scale of abstraction levels. The ex-
istence of hybrid work in analysis and modeling is an observation that creates hope
for a more holistic perception of digital system reliability. Already, prior art typically
borrows elements from a variety of reliability analysis and modeling subdomains. The
abundance of hybrid papers identified in the current classification explicitly confirms
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this claim. As a result, achieving a cross-layer reliability analysis/modeling paradigm
requires the synthesis of segmented approaches that already exist in the literature.
For that to happen, a seamless interaction between researchers working on various ab-
stractions of reliability should take place. From the material characterization domain
up to the level of system architecture, dependability, and resiliency, a succession of anal-
ysis and modeling phases should enable truly holistic reliability assessment of digital
systems.
Finally, it is interesting to look in the type and nature of reliability violations that
are injected and detected in analysis campaigns. From Tables I and II, we see that
the majority of cited work concentrates on the detection of functional errors. The
scope of injection is much wider by comparison. This is not surprising, as the de-
tection of parametric errors/faults is typically more complex. A functional violation is
easy to identify because it is abstract: either a functional error occurs or not. How-
ever, a parametric violation is represented by a continuous or generally multiple-
value random variable. This makes parametric violations more difficult to classify
and hence to detect. As a result, it may make more sense to inject a parametric
violation and then track its propagation by detecting the corresponding functional
aftereffects.
6.2. Reusability and Extensibility of the Proposed Classification Framework
In Sections 4 and 5, we instantiated representative samples in the appropriate leaves
of our classification framework. This binary diagram can be extended and reused when
the attention needs to be drawn to subdomains of reliability analysis and modeling.
For the sake of brevity of this article, we have restricted to only five levels of split-
ting. However, readers interested in technical development for reliability analysis or
modeling can further elaborate the framework by adding leaves in lower levels. In the
current section, we use two test cases and demonstrate the reusability/extensibility of
our classification framework. Let us consider the TDDBmechanism. It manifests itself
both in the gate stack of devices and across wires of an integrated system. We also as-
sume two modeling papers: one for TDDB manifestation on wires [Bekiaris et al. 2011]
and one for devices [Kimura 1999]. In case we would like to systematically classify
these two papers, we should further split the “irreversible mechanism” leaf of our clas-
sification framework (see Figure 10) into two complementary categories. The “wires
versus transistors” split comes about, as illustrated in Figure 12, where the resulting
leaves are again complementary.
Thus, the two papers can be seamlessly classified in the specialized leaves. Following
the same concept, the classification presented in this article can be extended in spe-
cialized areas of reliability analysis and modeling. Interested readers can start from
the splits proposed in this article and elaborate the framework in a way that best suits
their research area. Samples of prior art can ripple through the existing and newly
introduced splits (see Figure 12).
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this survey, we have covered a wide variety of prior art dealing with the analysis
and modeling of physically induced threats to digital system reliability. Analysis and
modeling are crucial for the development of efficient mitigation solutions that can
guarantee the reliability of modern electronic systems. Especially in view of reduced
device dimensions following the downscaling trend, a good understanding of reliability
violations and their underlying physical mechanisms is required.
Existing papers on reliability analysis and modeling classify either related terms
or available techniques, indicating an evident interest in this domain. However,
some classifications do not handle reliability violations in a systematic way. In other
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Fig. 12. Extending the proposed framework to lower classification levels.
cases, they appear to be application specific. In view of these features, we propose
a novel and systematic classification of prior art on reliability analysis and model-
ing. We use terminology that is as in-line as possible with terms used already in the
literature.
Our classification methodology is guaranteed to provide orthogonal categories be-
cause it is based on a binary decision diagram. The set of possible approaches toward
the topic in question is partitioned into subcategories in a top-down way. Each cate-
gory, at any given point, is split into two branches based on a distinguishing criterion.
Hence, a binary tree is created, the leaves of which are complementary. The target
research domain (i.e., the root of the tree) is thoroughly covered. In addition, the def-
initions presented herein do follow the complementarity principle of the classification
framework. The orthogonal nature of the classification framework allows mapping of
an inspected paper to more than one category. This is acceptable, as real research
scarcely is strictly complementary to all other alternative approaches. As a result,
such hybrid papers are classified easily: each aspect of the paper is analyzed when
the appropriate classification framework leaf is inspected. We should note that the
ability to properly account for hybrids is not supported in a systematic way by related
classifications.
The overall result of our categorization can be seen in Figure 13. All branches of
the classification framework have been populated with at least one representative
paper. A brief description of each paper supports the classification choice. To verify our
classification methodology, we have drawn papers from many domains ranging from
the architecture to the technology abstraction levels. That way, the systematic quality
and the completeness of our classification framework are substantiated. For each cited
paper, we identify the nature and type of target reliability violations. Furthermore,
we map each cited work to the corresponding representation and abstraction of digital
system design. This triggers interesting observations regarding the potential for a truly
cross-layer reliability analysis and modeling paradigm.
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